HOW TO CITE THIS ARTICLE: András Zs. Varga , Limited Precedent System and the Impact of Common Law on Adjudication: Evidence from the Curia of Hungary, Online Guest Lecture During The Global South Network Judges Guest Lecture Series, The Global South Network, 4 November 2025, https://globalsouthnetwork.com/limited-precedent-system-and-the-impact-of-common-law-on-adjudication-evidence-from-the-curia-of-hungary/ , accessed (access date)

Limited Precedent System and the Impact of Common Law on Adjudication: Evidence from the Curia of Hungary

Lecture by Prof. Dr. András Zs. Varga, President of the Curia of Hungary in the Global South Network’s Judges Guest Lecture Series

About the Author/Speaker: András Zs. Varga was born in 1968 in Marosvásárhely (Târgu Mureș). He graduated from the Faculty of Law of Eötvös Loránd University in 1995. He obtained his PhD degree in 2003, habilitated in 2010 and has been a university professor since 2012. In 2019, he graduated from the Faculty of Theology of Pázmány Péter Catholic University. He has been teaching constitutional law and administrative law at the Faculty of Law of Pázmány Péter Catholic University since 2004, and he was the faculty’s dean between 2013 and 2016. He worked as a rapporteur (1995-1996), then as a deputy head of department (1996-1999) and the director (1999-2000) of the Ombudsman’s Office. Between 2000 and 2006, then between 2010 and 2013, he acted as Deputy Prosecutor General responsible for public law matters. Between 2006 and 2010, he worked as chief counsellor tit. prosecutor at the Office of the Prosecutor General. Between 2013 and 2014, he was chief counsellor prosecutor at the Office of the Prosecutor General and served as the Prosecutor General’s legal advisor. Since 2013, he has been a member of the Venice Commission. Between 2014 and 2020, he served as a member of the Constitutional Court of Hungary. From 2020, he has been a full member of the Szent István Academy of Sciences. Since 1 July 2020, he has been acting as a judge appointed for an indefinite term. On 19 October 2020, he was appointed head of panel at the Curia of Hungary (Supreme Court). On 2 January 2021, he entered into office as President of the Curia of Hungary

Honourable Colleagues, Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Global South Network’s founder and chief convener, Dr Nauman Reayat, for inviting me to speak before you today. In my lecture, I would like to highlight the numerous points of contact between the common law and Hungarian systems of precedent, taking into account that Hungarian law belongs to the European continental civil law family. Fortunately in June, this year I had the opportunity to discuss about this topic with Lord Reed, President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. I will illustrate these parallels by presenting the case‑law unifying activities of the Curia of Hungary, the country’s supreme judicial forum: first with an overview of legal theory and legal history, followed by a description of the characteristics and experiences of the Hungarian limited precedent system that has been in place since 2020.

In the continental legal family, it is generally believed that, unlike common law courts, continental courts do not act on the basis of the precedent system. There is no stare decisis rule, and uniform legal interpretation is ensured in other ways – primarily by publishing the most important statements of the highest‑level judgments. Ultimately, in continental law, the presence of parallel legal interpretations in judgments cannot be ruled out. All this was based on the principle of judicial independence.

Of course, we see the convergence and mutual influence of the solutions of the two legal families. It was also a well-known phenomenon in continental law that if a lower court did not follow the consistent legal interpretation of the supreme court, then in the appeal or cassation procedure the supreme court annulled the different decision. Simply put: a kind of ‘natural’ precedent effect prevailed even without a formal precedent effect.

This effect was enhanced by the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The so-called preliminary ruling procedure was known from the very beginning of its operation. This can be initiated by any judge or court of a Member State, and as a result, the Court of Justice of the European Union provides a precise and binding interpretation of the different legal provisions of the Union. This is binding on the courts of the Member States from that point on. The decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union are thus formally precedent-like: they must be formally followed and appear in the case‑law of the courts of the Member States with an express reference (Cassis de Dijon case, Francovich case, Simmenthal case, etc.).

Less formally, but the same thing appeared in the practice of constitutional courts. Their decisions were also binding and formally referred to. Overall, therefore, continental countries have also become imperceptibly accustomed to the use of precedents. Hungary has made a step forward: we have drawn this conclusion in a formal way.

I.

Honourable Colleagues, hardly anything influences the functioning of the entire legal system as profoundly as the process of the application of law, the paramount importance of which is shared by the representatives of both the Anglo-Saxon and continental legal traditions. On the one hand, the result of the application of law, namely the decision, is linked to the question of “what is the law”: this is always a narrower legal concept relating to the relationship between the parties concerned. On the other hand, the application of law also perfectly demonstrates the fundamental problem of the uniform application of law. Common law and continental law therefore have a common starting point: through their professional knowledge, judges develop a practice that strives for uniformity, which justifies and explains the social existence of law. Decisions arise from social reality, are shaped by judicial interpretation, and influence the subsequent case‑law through their guidance. Although complete uniformity in the application of law is conceptually impossible, efforts must be made to achieve perfection—various means of uniformization are available for this purpose.

II.

This brief detour leads to the inevitable question: how did the decisions of the supreme court begin to serve as guiding precedents in the Hungarian legal system?

The Hungarian legal system belongs to the continental legal family. Legal thinking and practice focus on the uniformity of the application of law: courts apply the law in the same way in similar cases. The Fundamental Law of Hungary makes it the task of the Curia to ensure the uniform application of the law by the courts. In 2020, the introduction of a limited precedent system finished the development of long centuries.

Since 1723, the Curia has been the guardian of case‑law uniformity. From that date onwards, its decisions were referred to as decisiones, and its repeated interpretations of the law as decisio praejudicium. At that time, Hungarian judges did not yet rely on precedents, but on established trends in legal practice. Maria Theresa ordered the collection of the Curia’s decisions, which were published in print in 1769 under the name Planum Tabulare. In the 19^th century, in the spirit of modernisation, Hungarian law was adapted to the requirements of the time. By the end of the century, it had become the task of the Curia to ensure the uniformity of the administration of justice. In 1912, uniformity panels were established, whose decisions were binding. During the period of socialist dictatorship, these mechanisms were pushed into the background, but after the democratic transition, they were restored to constitutional status. At the end of the 1990s, uniformity decisions were revived.

III.

A limited precedent system was introduced in Hungary on 1 April 2020 (following the recommendations of the Venice Commission). Its essence is that it ensures the courts’ uniform legal practice through the formal binding force of the Curia’s decisions. It is important to clarify the meaning of the “limited” nature of our precedent system. Firstly, in a given legal issue, only the Curia’s decisions have precedent effect and are binding on the Curia’s judicial panels. They may depart from them only if they are allowed to do this by a uniformity decision of the Uniformity Panel composed of 21 senior judges.

The binding force is not so decisive in the case of lower instance courts. These courts may depart from precedents, if they give detailed justification to their different judgment. It is an important experience that case‑law uniformity can best be achieved through cassation proceedings. As I mentioned, in the event of a departure from the Curia’s decision, the lower instance court must provide detailed reasons; the reasons and the departure itself may be examined by the Curia in a cassation procedure at the request of the parties. The cassation procedure is subject to strict admissibility requirements, and in this procedure the Curia seeks to determine whether the decision under review was lawful.

Another binding instruments are the uniformity decisions, which can be initiated in the form of a motion for a preliminary ruling. As it was mentioned, if one of the panels of the Curia wishes to interpret the law differently in a given case, it cannot do so freely. Before making a decision, the panel has to suspend the proceedings and initiate a uniformity procedure, in which a separate panel of the Curia decides on the possibility of departure and on the interpretation of the question of law raised in the motion. The panel initiating the procedure may only issue a decision that is consistent with the interpretation contained in the uniformity decision.

Furthermore, from 2020, a new sui generis form of legal remedy was introduced into the legal system: the uniformity complaint procedure. This instrument is exceptional: at the request of the parties to the proceedings, it contributes to ensuring case‑law uniformity in a way that affects them, which means that it examines the issue of case‑law uniformity not at a theoretical level and in general, but in a specific, individual case. A uniformity complaint may be lodged against a Curia decision if the petition for cassation already decided was not sufficient. The basis of the complaint is always a reference to a departure from a previously published decision of the Curia. As regards the outcome of the proceedings: if the Curia finds that there has been an unjustified departure, it will quash the contested decision of the adjudicating panel of the Curia. If, on the other hand, it finds the departure to be justified, it will issue a new, binding interpretation of the law, and its previous decisions to the contrary will no longer be binding.

It is important to note that both the uniformity procedure and the uniformity complaint procedure described above are conducted by the Uniformity Panel of the Curia, which acts in two sections consisting of 20 judges each, in addition to the President. In certain cases, these sections may be supplemented by members of the relevant chamber of the Curia, or the Uniformity Panel may refer the case to the Full Bench of the Curia. In 2024, the Curia issued 17 uniformity decisions and 40 uniformity complaint decisions, 14 of which were on‑the‑merits decisions, including three decisions having the effect of a uniformity decision.

The uniformity complaint procedure therefore requires reasoning similar to that of the Anglo-Saxon precedent system: the Curia has to compare the contested decision with the previously published decision and to examine whether there has been a different interpretation of the law. At this point, it is worth emphasising that the task of establishing case‑law uniformity naturally involves self-control as well, whereby the supreme judicial forum exercises a kind of control over its own decisions in order to be able to adapt to the multitude and diversity of new issues.

The distinguished role played by the Curia in ensuring case‑law uniformity is also evident in the fact that, on the one hand, it is one of the superior courts that determine the functioning of the judiciary and, on the other hand, it also has an intermediary role between the other superior courts, the Constitutional Court of Hungary, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights and the courts of general jurisdiction. By issuing new or different interpretations of the law, the Curia can ensure that its decisions are even more consistent with the decisions of the aforementioned superior courts. The Curia therefore strives to establish effective supranational dialogue in the same way as other national supreme courts.

IV.

It is clear that case‑law uniformity cannot be merely an internal judicial matter. The significance of the foregoing was also highlighted in case C-537/22, the Global Ink Trade case: in a multi-level constitutional system, there may be a conflict between the case‑law of the supreme court and that of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The decision addresses a specific problem within the scope of the principle of the primacy of EU law, namely when there is a conflict between the interpretation contained in a precedent-setting judgment of the supreme court and the interpretation of the law by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In its judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union itself confirms that this system is not contrary to the principle of primacy.

The Hungarian limited precedent system thus embodies a unique compromise. On the one hand, it breaks with the continental tradition that the judicial practice of the supreme court, the Curia is merely of an orientating character. On the other hand, it preserves the principle that the law stands at the top of the hierarchy of legal sources and that judicial decisions do not become norms equal to legislation. In this way, while remaining tied to the continental tradition, it seeks to respond to the challenges of a globalised world in which following precedent has become an essential condition for legal certainty.

Honourable Colleagues, Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is no need to explain why the uniform application of the law is a priority for all courts, and especially for the Curia, as the latter is the depository of this mission as specified in the Fundamental Law of Hungary. In addition to ensuring case‑law uniformity, there are two outstanding requirements inherent in the administration of justice that cannot be compromised and must be vigilantly guarded. On the one hand, “intelligent fidelity” to the law is desirable, and on the other hand, the protection of subjective rights guaranteed by law must be ensured.

In every modern legal system, it is obvious that these must be taken into account in the adjudication of cases, and that the integrity of the law must be re-established and recreated again and again with respect for them. At the same time, the Curia can be a strong pillar of law if it continuously monitors the daily tasks arising in the field of case‑law uniformity. And we do this by combining the tasks of deciding the individual cases based on their particular features and of monitoring the decisions of our colleagues.

Thank you for your kind attention!